

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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Remark:

Executive Secretary

4/26/82

Date

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State Dept. review completed



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Executive Registry
82-4669/2

April 23, 1982

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MEMORANDUM TO: White House - Mr. William P. Clark
JCS - Lt. Gen. Paul F. Gorman
OSD - Mr. Francis J. West
CIA -
Treasury - Mr. Marc Leland
Energy - Mr. Henry E. Thomas

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SUBJECT: NSSD 4-82, Revised Version of Section I-B

Attached is a revised version of Section I-B, "U.S. Interests and Objectives" of NSSD 4-82. This version, which has taken into account suggestions made by the Interagency Review Group on April 19, received Working Group clearance on April 20.

L. Paul Bremer
L. Paul Bremer, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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Attachment:

As stated.

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NSSD 4-82

SECRETI. U.S. Interests and ObjectivesB. Regional1. U.S. Interests

The United States has two primary national security interests in the Near East-Southwest Asia region. The first is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty of regional states friendly to the U.S. The second is to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in concert with intra- and extra-regional allies and friends, must prepare to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale Soviet aggression.

2. U.S. Objectives

In support of these interests, the U.S. has the following basic objectives in the region:

- to deter overt Soviet military aggression and to be prepared to combat the Soviets if necessary.
- To protect U.S. and Western access to adequate supplies of oil.
- To support other U.S. economic interests.
- To counter and reverse Moscow's efforts to extend its influence by other means.
- To maintain the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel.
- To continue to pursue a comprehensive, lasting Middle East peace.
- To strengthen local and regional stability by helping to improve economic conditions in and defense capabilities of friendly states.
- To pursue, where possible, opportunities to expand U.S. influence with selected regional states..

a. Deter and Combat Soviet Agression

United States objectives are directed toward deterring Soviet and Soviet-inspired aggression or intervention. Such aggression in the region would not only endanger direct U.S. interests, but would have significant ramifications for global U.S. interests given the region's strategic location and resources. Not least of these broader interests would be the repercussions for NATO of a Soviet military move toward the Gulf.

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The U.S. must also be prepared to help friendly governments (beyond the narrow confines of the oil producing states) to defend their territory in the region when directly threatened by the Soviets or their surrogates. However, the extent of this support for countries such as Pakistan needs to be determined.

The U.S. would have to take the lead -- with the support of our friends and allies, both in the region and out -- in offering resistance to Soviet aggression. In the case of hostilities not directly involving the Soviets, however, we would expect countries of the region to take the lead -- with U.S. support as required.

b. Protect U.S. and Western Access to Oil

The continued viability of the economies of many of the industrialized countries -- particularly of Western Europe and Japan -- is dependent upon continued access to adequate supplies of Persian Gulf oil at reasonable prices. In percentage terms, the United States is less dependent on Gulf oil than most of our key allies and trading partners, but the volume of Gulf oil imported by the United States remains considerable -- despite successful efforts to lessen this amount. This difference in vulnerability notwithstanding, the closely interrelated nature of Western economies (including Japan's) makes it impossible for the United States to insulate itself from the shock which would be felt by the West were access to Gulf oil arbitrarily curtailed for whatever reason. This mutual interest is recognized by our commitment to the oil sharing system of the International Energy Agency. Clearly, the factors which threaten Western access to Gulf oil also threaten U.S. vital interests.

c. Support Other U.S. Economic Interests

The oil wealth of the region, combined with the development of international trade in general, has resulted in the growth of a network of mutual economic interests between Western banks and business enterprises and their private and governmental counterparts in the region. This is a source of economic growth and stability but could also become a source of economic weakness in the West should conditions result in the disruption of existing banking and trading relationships. A major U.S. objective in the region is the support of U.S. economic interests including financial cooperation.

d. Counter and Reverse Moscow's Efforts to Extend Its Influence

The danger of Soviet or Soviet-supported military seizure of the oil fields of the Gulf represents the most serious -- if least likely -- of threats. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

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demonstrated Moscow's willingness to use direct force in the pursuit of its own interests; an important U.S. objective must be to demonstrate that such action on the part of the Soviets does not pay. Scarcely less dangerous for our interests, however, would be a significant extension of Soviet hegemony or influence in the region by other means. Moscow continues to use other, more subtle tools at its disposal to increase its regional influence, often at Western expense. These include arms sales, economic assistance, political support and subversive activity. The U.S. must be alert to Moscow's efforts to expand its regional influence and must be in a position not only to take steps to deter and defeat outright aggression, but also to counter other means of Soviet political and economic advancement in the region.

e. Maintain the U.S. Commitment to the Security of Israel and Pursue a Comprehensive, Lasting Middle East Peace

Our commitment to the security of Israel has been reinforced over the years by the statements of U.S. political leaders and by the bipartisan support which Congress and the American people have extended to Israel. Israel, a democratic state with close ties to the United States, has a special place in American foreign policy. Nevertheless, U.S. and Israeli objectives are not always in harmony, given our differing histories, responsibilities and strategic viewpoints. It is critical for the broader interests of our two countries that we do everything possible to harmonize our policies in a way that supports U.S. objectives and interests.

The relationship between progress on the security and peace fronts is complex. A more secure Israel, for example, might be more willing to accept certain risks inherent in political initiatives. At the same time, moving towards Middle East peace will increase Israel's long-term security interests as well as lessen the danger of Arab-Israeli conflict and reduce the ability of the Soviet Union to polarize the Middle East by playing on Arab-Israeli differences. Movement toward peace and a resolution of the Palestinian problem will also influence the willingness of regional states to cooperate with the United States in defense matters. The extent of this influence, however, is uncertain, and will be addressed in subsequent sections of this study.

f. Strengthen Local and Regional Stability

Finally, we cannot achieve our objectives without strengthening local and regional stability. This is best accomplished by helping to promote economic growth and by taking steps to improve the defense capabilities of certain states of the region against indigenous and external threats, particularly in Pakistan,

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Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and along access routes to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. A key U.S. objective is to foster broad strategic consensus and regional defense cooperation against these threats whenever practical. But, recognizing that indigenous forces alone may be inadequate to meet such threats, we must be prepared to back efforts with our own resources. Security assistance in all its forms thus constitutes an essential dimension of U.S. policy towards Southwest Asia.

g. Pursue Opportunities to Expand U.S. Influence with Selected States

Certain states, e.g., Iraq, Syria, Iran, while basically unfriendly to the U.S., might, for various reasons present opportunities which the U.S. could exploit to advantage. While care would have to be taken to avoid harming our larger interests, the U.S. should retain sufficient flexibility to seize such opportunities when they do arise.

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MEMORANDUM FOR DCI

82-46691

Attached is a copy of the draft overview NESA submitted to the NSC for NSSD 4. I thought you might be interested because it summarizes our view of the major threats to the stability of the area. As you can tell, the thrust is pessimistic and we expect new shocks to US interests in the region.

D/NESA

cc: DDCI

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